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In the past several years, attacks over industrial control systems (ICS) have become increasingly frequent and sophisticated. The
most common objectives of these types of attacks are controlling/monitoring the physical process, manipulating programmable
controllers, or affecting the integrity of software and networking equipment. As one of the widely applied protocols in the ICS
world, EtherCAT is an Ethernet-based protocol; thus, it is exposed to both TCP/IP and ICS-specific attacks. In this paper, we
analyze EtherCAT field-level communication principles from the security viewpoint focusing on the protocol vulnerabilities,
which have been rarely analyzed previously. Our research showed that it lacks the most common security parameters, such
as authentication, encryption, and authorization, and is open to Media Access Control (MAC) spoofing, data injection, and
other advanced attacks, which require superior skills. To prevent, detect, and reduce attacks over the EtherCAT-based critical
systems, first, we improved the open-source Snort intrusion detection/prevention system (IDS/IPS) to support packets that are not
processed over transport and network layers. Second, by incorporating a vulnerability analysis, we proposed the EtherCAT (ECAT)
preprocessor. Third, we introduced a novel approach called trust-node identification and applied the approach as three rules into
the preprocessor. In this sense, the ECAT preprocessor differs from other supported ICS preprocessors in the literature, such as
DNP3 and Modbus/TCP. Besides supporting traditional rule expansion, it is also able to handle layer 2 packets and to apply deep
packet inspection on EtherCAT packets using the trust-node approach. This method first identifies engineering-station approved
nodes based on EtherCAT network information (ENI) configuration files and then deeply inspects incoming packets, considering
protocol specifications.The improvements and approach have been tested on the physically developed testbed environment and we
have proved that proposals can detect related attacks and provide a basic level of security over the EtherCAT-implemented systems.
1. Introduction
Industrial automation systems are generally divided into
three categories according to the application fields, which are
factory, process, and building automation. These automation
systems are designed to provide the integration between in-
formation technology (IT) communication, such as the man-
ufacturing execution system (MES) level or enterprise re-
source planning (ERP) level, and field communication, such
as cell, field, or sensor/actuator levels [1]. Controlling, ensur-
ing sustainability of, and monitoring the critical system
automations, which are created considering the hierarchical
structure, are achieved via supervisory control and data-
acquisition (SCADA) systems. Additionally, the planning and
execution levels in IT communication for automation systems
provide ERP andMES features and services through Ethernet
and TCP/IP protocols, which are known de facto.
Field communication was previously only carried out by
Profibus, Interbus, Devicenet, Controlnet, and other fieldbus
protocols in the past. Due to the idea of using a single protocol
for both horizontal and vertical communication, nowa-
days, the automation hierarchy is managed by the Ethernet
and/or Ethernet-based protocols. Modbus/TCP, EtherNet/IP,
PROFINET, EtherCAT, Ethernet Powerlink, Sercos III, and
other protocols are examples of Ethernet-based protocols.
They are directed by different manufacturers or technology
groups. While this new trend offers benefits in terms of cost
reduction, increased speed, and communication complexity
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reduction for automation systems, it also provides advantages
and disadvantages regarding integration of the Ethernet-
based protocols used in the field and in IT.
Eventually, the direction of the stated technological
improvements led the industry to form an automation sys-
tem that communicates using Ethernet or Ethernet-based
protocols, contains configured IT services (web, ftp, mail,
etc.), integrates with TCP/IP infrastructure, and is moni-
tored/controlled through SCADA software [2]. Thus, even
a terminal device in the field can be controlled directly or
indirectly via Ethernet.
Ethernet and TCP/IP protocols are well known, and the
diversity and success of the attacks are exhaustively studied
in the literature [3, 4]. This duo introduces security risks and
cyberthreats into industrial control systems (ICS) as well.
According to a survey in 2015, over 65% of SCADA system
attacks are achieved against the communication infrastruc-
ture [5]. This observation clearly shows the importance of
cyberthreats for the communication network. In this context,
over the last decade, various global attacks have been carried
out through the communication infrastructure, such as leak-
ing or attacking Iran’s nuclear plants, the US subway collision
avoidance system, Middle Eastern and North African oil
plants, or the Ukrainian power grid [6–12].
Themost common types of attacks are man in the middle
(MITM), denial of service (DoS), distributed DoS (DDoS),
cryptographic, replay, and buffer overflow attacks. The main
reason behind the attack excess and diversity is that many of
the protocols used in ICS do not possess encryption, authen-
tication, and authorization services, which are considered as
key parameters in the network security. Therefore, to reduce
cyberrisks in the system, the proper implementation of pro-
tocols and standards and the identification andminimization
of implementation-based vulnerabilities are necessary.
In addition, security teams or administrators are not
aware of their control system assets and do not obtain patch
feeds or track the vulnerability disclosures and harden their
systems. According to a vulnerability trend report from 2016,
vulnerability disclosures rapidly increased from 2014 to 2015.
However, 516 of them did not have a patch at the time
of disclosure [13]. This means that, out of the over 1,552
vulnerabilities analyzed, 33% are zero-day vulnerabilities and
could not be fixed before exploitation. In this regard, more
research and analyses are needed for zero-day or other
potential vulnerabilities before they are publicly disclosed.
Cheminod et al. presented a review for the current situation
and management security of industrial automation control
system [14].
The EtherCAT protocol studied in this paper is exten-
sively applied in industrial automation and accepted as a
hard real-time (RT) protocol where a statistical distribution
of response times cannot be tolerated. The short cycle times,
speed, topology flexibility, scalability, product diversity, and
cost advantages, which are essential arguments in critical
systems, have enabled EtherCAT to become a major pro-
tocol running on industrial automation systems compared
to Modbus/TCP, EtherNet/IP, PROFINET RT, or Sercos
III [15]. In addition, while PROFINET supports real-time
and non-real-time communication through three structures,
namely, PROFINETNRT, IRT, and RT, EtherCAT can handle
this only through one protocol. Moreover, EtherCAT speed
outperforms PROFINET IRT in terms of short cycle times
[16]. It has a 0.1ms response time and less than 0.1ms jitter
for a 100Mbit/s data rate [17].
If IP routing is needed to communicate with different
SCADA systems or different SCADA infrastructures within
the same system, besides using the standard Ethernet frame
structure defined in IEEE 802.3, it can be transferred over
UDP/IP networks by adding the IP address to the frame
[18]. This feature enables communication across routers
in different subnets. However, it can only be used for IP
routing purposes, meaning that frames cannot be used in all
UDP/IP supported network devices. Although EtherCAT has
advantages based on the fields of application, as inmany other
critical infrastructure protocols, it has a security problem of
not including encryption, authentication, or authorization
components in SCADA communications.
Therefore, in this study, to increase communication
security and detect and prevent attacks against EtherCAT-
implemented systems, the protocol structure and vulnerabil-
ities are analyzed, and a novel solution is proposed to prevent
exploitation of these weaknesses. The solution consists of the
development of a new EtherCAT (ECAT) preprocessor on
an open-source Snort IDS/IPS system and an application of
a trust-node communication structure in the ECAT prepro-
cessor. The proposal relies on passive monitoring; thus, real-
time communication is not interrupted and does not cause
extra load in the EtherCAT operation under real working
conditions in an industrial environment. The novelty of our
study is that it is the first research in the literature specifically
focusing on EtherCAT communication vulnerabilities and
introducing the trust-node approach to be used in Snort as
a solution to improve EtherCAT security. In this context,
the vulnerability analysis is performed by attack vectors on
device-level communication, as it is responsible for carrying
time-sensitive information. The analysis results proved that
the EtherCATprotocol does not have any flow or connection-
based security to recognize master and slaves. Thus, it is
vulnerable toMedia Access Control (MAC) spoofing,MITM,
DoS, and TCP/IP attacks or other sophisticated attacks, such
as node accessing and command injection. As part of our
research, Snort is improved to support layer 2 packets for
preprocessors. Later, the ECAT preprocessor is introduced
with the trust-node communication approach. The approach
mainly provides a basic level of prevention by recognizing
each node over the EtherCAT-applied SCADA systems.
Considering that most of the critical infrastructure protocols
have vendor-provided eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
or General Station Description- (GSD-) based ID files for
almost each component, our novel proposal is a general
solution and applicable to a broad range of protocols.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present the literature review based on the EtherCAT or other
protocols emphasizing the vulnerabilities and related solu-
tions. Then, in Section 3, we look closer into the EtherCAT
communication principles, device protocol, and configura-
tion files distributed by the manufacturers or generated by
the configuration tool. In Section 4, we present the testbed
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environment and vulnerability analysis performed by the
generated attack vectors. In Section 5, we propose the ECAT
preprocessor and the trust-node identification approach. In
Sections 6 and 7, we give some final remarks and the future
directions of the research.
2. Related Work
2.1. Security Studies of Ethernet-Based Protocols (Except
ECAT). Many of the Ethernet-based industrial automation
protocols communicate in plaintext (without encryption)
without authorization and authentication [19, 20]. One of the
discussions about these protocols is that if the protocol frame
structure is known, a variety of attacks could be performed
aiming to debilitate the fundamental components of secure
communication, which are known de facto and called CIA
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) [21].
In this regard, various attack vectors have been developed,
threatening the integrity principle on Siemens S7 communi-
cation. Some of these attack types are detecting the memory
addresses of data blocks and input/output units of the PLC by
simple queries, identifying the module vendor information,
model number, and features of the PLC via MITM attacks,
manipulating the program written by the engineering station
while it is downloading to the PLC or code/program injection
related to the lack of authorization or encryptionmechanisms
[22, 23]. Other vulnerabilities, such as displaying PLC RAM
or stopping/running the PLC, are also discovered by the at-
tack vectors.
The exploits of these vulnerabilities are posted to the
Metasploit framework, which is a tool widely used for ex-
ploitation or testing purposes [24–26]. For PROFINET com-
munication, the session ID and session information are trans-
ferred without encryption. Moreover, this ID can be used
multiple times, unless the ID is not being used by another
session on the server side.
Taking advantage of these vulnerabilities, session hijack-
ing attacks and privilege escalation in the wake of hijacking
are carried out [27]. In addition, DoS attacks are generated
again on PROFINET communication, aiming to fuzz the pro-
tocol or stop the service. These types of attacks do not neces-
sarily have to be complicated. For instance, one of the attacks
relies on sending crafted PROFINET packets to convey the
invalid/nonsense information to a PROFINET device using
the DCP services [28]. This vulnerability was discovered in
2014 and added to the vulnerability database as “CVE-2014-
2252” [29].
Intrusion detection systems and monitoring systems are
important in terms of early detection of potential attacks
on both the protocol and the system [30, 31]. Within this
context, Ntalampiras et al. developed a hiddenMarkovmodel
based on a fault-monitoring system for independent critical
infrastructures [32]. The authors categorized critical system
component data according to their distance from the training
data. They generated two types of outcomes: DoS and replay
attacks.
Besides the general-purpose research, there are studies
focused on protocol specifications as well. For instance,
Goldenberg and Wool modeled the Modbus/TCP proto-
col for intrusion detection. The researchers identified each
communication channel between the HMI and PLC using
deterministic finite automata (DFA) [33].They achieved high
accuracy on abnormal detection and faster detection of im-
proper HMI configurations.
In 2014, Siemens S7 SCADA communication was mod-
eled as an intrusion detection and monitoring system [34].
However, the proposed models had only periodic communi-
cation and client-server connections. Peer communications
and aperiodic communication were not considered.
In addition to the intrusion detection system studies,
there are other solutions in the literature. For instance, Cook
et al. assigned identification to the attacks based on the fact
that each attack possesses a unique behavior [35]. Then, the
authors evaluated digital monitoring, malware analysis, net-
work monitoring, honeypot, or trace monitoring methods,
which are commonly used for identifying attacks.
Another technique used for attack detection was intro-
duced in 2015 as an agent-node addition [36]. This study first
spotted critical nodes of the power system by applying span-
ning tree algorithms. Then, it places an agent node between
the twomost critical nodes.The virtual node always generates
the same virtual data and tries to mislead the attacker. The
system is monitored by a master station, and in case of an
attempt to change the agent-node data, an alert is generated.
Byres et al. investigated the difficulty levels of Modbus-
implemented SCADA system attacks, vulnerabilities exploit-
ed by the attacks, and attack goals by attack trees [4].They also
evaluated the security risks and key parameters that need to
be considered on protocol specification.
Finally, Ramachandruni and Poornachandran developed
a honeypot system that simulates the Modbus and S7 PLC
[37]. They connected the system to the external network and
gathered real data for 30 days.Then, they identified the attack
vector types on critical systems.
As stated, the research in the literature focuses on sub-
jects such as monitoring systems, mathematical modeling of
attacks/protocols for abnormal detection, or simulating the
attacks on systems for threat identification. The future direc-
tion of studies confirms the need for a structure thatmonitors
the critical infrastructure systems and prevents the attacks at
the same time.This type of solution, which detects potentially
malicious probes without generating any artificial test traffic,
is called passive monitoring. It basically monitors the system
inactively, that way preserving the real-time properties of the
systems, and takes actions in the case of abnormal situations.
Another research field is IDS/IPS improvement to sup-
port critical infrastructure protocols. Snort, as a commonly
used IDS/IPS system, provides preprocessors for analyzing
incoming network packets. Recently, only Modbus/TCP and
DNP3 preprocessors have been introduced by Snort devel-
opers to identify SCADA protocol packets. The ECAT pre-
processor has not been developed yet. In addition, it is a
challenge to develop an ECAT preprocessor because Ether-
CAT has a different communication structure from the other
two protocols. Even though the released preprocessors have
different characteristics, they have a similarity in that both
of them transfer packets over TCP or UDP. The main reason
for this is that the preprocessor base structure given by Snort
only supports packets on layer 3. However, EtherCAT does
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not have a TCP/UDP header in the field and factory levels
(except IP-tunneled communication) and requires further
investigation by Snort for forwarding packets at layer 2.
2.2. Security Studies of ECAT. EtherCAT is one of the most
widely applied protocols in the critical infrastructures. It
has many features, such as hardware and software support
diversity, as well as topology independency and performance.
It supports lower cycle times since it processes packets in a
byte-by-byte manner, namely, on the fly [38]. However, there
are a few studies done in the literature focusing on the security
aspect. In this section, research is grouped into three cate-
gories, that is,monitoring/data-gathering proposals, environ-
mental developments, and protocol improvements.
The industrial network security book states that the
EtherCAT protocol is open to DoS/DDoS attacks [39]. The
author also emphasized the need for both MAC-based and
master/slave communication-based systems or products to
prevent unwanted EtherCAT flows. Related to this, a real-
time data-acquisition system is introduced for gathering
EtherCAT data securely with high speed [40]. Similarly, a
proposal is presented for data acquisition on distributed
EtherCAT-based systems.The study, which targets high accu-
racy and speed of data collection, is evaluated on the FPGA
environment [41]. Another study is about the performance
and design analysis of the data-acquisition systems [42]. The
main problem regarding these studies is that the data-acquisi-
tion proposals can be considered a substitution for conven-
tional data-acquisition cards, so that they do not possess any
threat detection or protection properties on behalf of system
security.
However, performance analysis studies have been done
to improve the protocol. Knezic et al. proposed an algorithm
that utilizes the frame size by examining data patterns within
the EtherCAT frame [43]. In addition, researchers have
recently evaluated the protocol efficiency using a simulation
on MATLAB or by measuring hardware latencies on Ether-
CAT switches [44, 45].
Likewise, BeStorm developed a dynamic testing tool
supporting EtherCAT [46]. This tool is commercial and only
performs black-box fuzzing, which is a basic-level fuzzing
approach that can be applied when the target is unknown.
The recent study on EtherCAT security is presented in [47].
The research, however, does not mention the preprocessor
structure, and only Snort rules are used for attack detection
without proposing a novel attack-detection mechanism.
As stated above, during the literature review, various
studies have been introduced on ICS and protocols used for
system communications. They essentially focus on attack or
threat detection, system or protocol optimization, or testing
new approaches. However, as we outlined in this section, in-
dustrial automation system research, which specifically stud-
ies protocol-based security issues, is inadequate in the litera-
ture.
Moreover, there are many other factors that affect the
security of these systems. Even small-scale attacks may cause
catastrophic results due to the strategic location of critical
systems. Mandatory controls applied on other systems, such
as penetration tests, cannot be applied or are not advised for
these systems because of their critical infrastructure. Thus,
existing vulnerabilities cannot be explored.
In addition, these systems do not have fundamental secu-
rity parameters, such as encryption, authorization, or authen-
tication, so that if the frame structure and communication
patterns are known, exposure to attacks is inevitable. All these
security aspects influence the control systems in that they are
open to attacks. From this point of view, to increase security
against internal or external attacks, original proposals, such as
passive monitoring, which detects malicious actions without
creating any load on the system, can be introduced based on
observational studies. In this paper, to contribute to the secu-
rity of EtherCAT-implemented industrial automation sys-
tems, we took the intrusion prevention and detection re-
search as a lodestar and conducted research on protocol vul-
nerability detection and attack prevention.
3. EtherCAT Protocol in
Industrial Automation
In automation hierarchy, protocols used for fieldbus commu-
nication provide real-time criteria by keeping the setpoints
for cycle time and cycle-time delay variance parameters.This
situation also applies to Ethernet-based protocols. Therefore,
Ethernet-based protocols have made significant modifica-
tions to meet with the real-time requirements on protocol
structure and hardware used for executing protocols. Real-
time Ethernet protocols are divided into two categories,
namely, soft real time (RT) and hard RT.While Modbus/TCP
is a soft RT protocol, protocols such as CC-Link, PROFINET,
Sercos III, and EtherCAT are considered as hard RT. In this
research, a hard RT protocol EtherCAT, which communicates
over a frame carried by the modified Ethernet header, is
studied.
The EtherCAT protocol has been managed by the Ether-
CAT organization since 2003. In comparison with other hard
RTprotocols, it has several advantages. For instance, it usually
communicates over a standard Ethernet framewithout any IP
addressing and supports up to the data-link layer. However,
if an EtherCAT network needs controlling through other
subnets, the EtherCAT frames can be addressed and routed by
adding UDP/IP headers. Moreover, it provides a short cycle
time, topology flexibility, product variety, scalability, and
low cost and supports real-time features through only one
protocol (e.g., EtherCAT has better performance on real-time
synchronous communication compared to the PROFINET
IRT protocol [27]). The short cycle-time property of the
EtherCAT is provided by on-the-fly technology [48]. The
EtherCAT processes each frame in bytes, and this makes it
faster even than Sercos III, which has a similar feature but
processes input and output data individually (dual process-
ing) on the fly.
Moreover, [15] stated that EtherCAT is the fastest indus-
trial Ethernet technology with low update and response
times. The response time of the EtherCAT is 0.1ms, which is
better than Ethernet/IP, Ethernet Powerlink, PROFINET IRT,
and Sercos III [17]. Since these properties are the key points
in critical systems, EtherCAT has become one of the major
protocols in the automation sector.
























































Figure 1: EtherCAT communication at all levels.
The founder and biggest supporter company of EtherCAT
is Beckhoff. Since its establishment, Beckhoff has focused
on computer-based automation applications and thus pro-
gresses in a different area from other automation companies.
Beckhoff PLCs have theWindows operating system installed.
Some properties of EtherCAT by Beckhoff, such as being
Ethernet-based, the on-the-fly feature, the ability to integrate
with UDP/IP, and the manageability of PLCs via Windows
operating systems, provide incontrovertible advantages for
providing the hard RT feature in the automation industry;
however, they also bring many handicaps from a security
viewpoint.
3.1. EtherCAT Communication at All Levels and Device Pro-
tocol. The TwinCAT program environment provides PLC
programming and system configurations in the EtherCAT-
applied systems. TwinCAT has a unique property and PLC
programming, program/configuration downloading, and
hardware configuring features. If PLC does not exist in the
system or if there is a need for a PLC for testing purposes, the
TwinCAT-installed engineering station can act as a PLC.The
EtherCAT protocol supports typical master-master, slave-
master, and slave-slave communications of critical systems.
These communications are performed over three protocols:
device, automation (EAP), and UDP protocols by integrating
IP (Figure 1). The point to be noted here is that all types of
communication are realized via a single type of cable: the
Ethernet cable.
The EAP communicates via two subprotocols, namely,
mailbox and process data protocols. The EAP transfers
EtherCAT packets between master terminals and offers com-
munication among cell, MES, and ERP levels in the autom-
ation hierarchy.
Another type of EtherCAT communication is outer sys-
tems communication. In this type of communication, the IP
address is used, and transport is done over the UDP protocol.
Therefore, by defining the extra 28 bytes of UDP and IP
headers, accessing EtherCAT applications through other
subnets is supported.
Since EtherCAT is an Ethernet-based standard, each
EtherCAT packet is encapsulated by the Ethernet header.The
EtherType of EtherCAT is defined as 0x88A4 in the Ethernet
header. The type field in the header identifies the type of the
data carried and may contain different values, as shown in
Figure 2 [43]. In our research, we specifically focused on the
field-level communication so that IP-based and EAP-based
communication levels are out of the scope of this study.
3.1.1. Device Protocol. The device protocol is essentially
responsible for handling field or sensor/actuator level com-
munications. It exchanges data between slaves and masters
and has its own frame structure. If the carried payload
belongs to the device protocol, the value “1” is written to
the type field in the main EtherCAT header. As illustrated in
Figure 3, following the outer EtherCAT header, each Ether-
CAT datagram has its own header. This way, as an Ethernet
packet passes through the slave stations like cars of a train,
each station recognizes its own datagram. Each EtherCAT
datagram has 2 bytes of “working counter” values at the end.
During the data exchange inside each slave, this counter is
incremented by 1 for read or write access and by 3 for read/
write command executions in the memory [28].
If there are more datagrams following the current data-
gram, theMbit is set to 1 in the datagramheader. In each data-
gram header, there are 32 bits of address field. This field
indicates the unique slave addresses produced in a specific
pattern.The address field can be filled in three different ways:
(i) If station-address assignments will be done according
to their positions, automatic addresses are defined
consisting of 16-bit position and 16-bit offset (auto-
matically incremented by 1). In this case, the cmd
command field will take APxx-type commands.
(ii) If user-defined addresseswill be used, 16-bit addresses
and 16-bit offsets are used, and the command fieldwill
take FPxx-type commands.
(iii) If logical addressing will be used, all 32 bits are
addressed as logical, and the command field will take
Lxx-type commands.
Command types can be used as follows:
(i) Automatically incremented and assigned addresses
have read (R), write (W), read and write (R/W), and
read and multiple write (RMW) access.
(ii) Logically assigned addresses only have R,W, andR/W
access.
(iii) The NOP command is used to pass without any exe-
cution or change in status.
(iv) The broadcast command (Bxx) is used for unac-
knowledged transmission to an unspecified number
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4 bit 1 bit 11 bit 
R
2 bytes 14 bytes 
ECAT headerEthernet header ……. Last datagram 
Max. 1498 bytes Type:
0: Reserved 
1: EtherCAT device comm.
2, 3: Reserved 
4: EAP process data comm.
5: EAP mailbox comm.
6–15: Reserved
1st datagram 
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Logical memory: LRD, LWR, 
LRW
ECAT headerEthernet header ……. Last datagram 1st datagram 
2 bytes 
2 bytes 
14 bytes max. 1498 bytes
8 bits
Figure 3: Device protocol.
of receivers, where all the stations share part of the
frame. It could be sent for initialization or checking
status of all the slaves. It has R, W, and R/W access.
3.2. EtherCAT Slave Information/EtherCAT Network Infor-
mation Files. In EtherCAT-based systems, the EtherCAT
network information (ENI) and EtherCAT slave information
(ESI) files indicate a trust relationship between slave or
master terminals. These files are in XML format and contain
startup configurations of communications. Each slave has
an ESI file, which includes factory default properties of the
slave created by the manufacturer. The ESI files specifically
contain manufacturer information, device information, such
as the module, group, or order number, and the default
parameters used during the communication as presented in
Figure 4. These files are distributed during manufacturing
and are stored in the TwinCAT installation directory. All
ESI information and/or online information sent from the
slave EEPROMs is extracted and combined as one ENI
file that describes the transmission details between masters
and slaves. The ENI file consists of factory-assigned PLC
information, such as the MAC address, PLC configuration
information, synchronous data exchange information, the
mailbox and its subprotocol information, slave information,
and process data identification information.The ENI.xml file
given in Figure 4 presents our actual testbed configurations.
If necessary, the ENI file can be exported by the EtherCAT
engineering station or other third-party configuration tools.
In this paper, the ENI files generated by the engineering
station are considered.
Section 5.2.2 introduces the trust-node identification
approach, which is designed using the ESI and ENI config-
uration file data. For the trust-node identification approach,
we used theMAC address information of master stations and
the PhysAddr, AutoIncAddr, command, order of command,
and data-size information of each slave.
4. EtherCAT Vulnerability Research
In this section, protocol vulnerabilities that are caused by
exploiting the protocol weaknesses caused by the absence
of encryption, authentication, and authorization features in
the EtherCAT protocol, similar to other industrial protocols,
are analyzed. As a result of analysis, predicted vulnerabilities
are evaluated on the device level by attack vectors so that
protocol weaknesses are identified. To prevent exploitation
of these proved vulnerabilities, a basic-level EtherCAT pro-
tocol decoder, preprocessor, and trust-node identification
approach within the preprocessor are developed on an open-
source IDS/IPS system named Snort.
4.1. Testbed. The test environment is created by real hardware
at Cyber Security Laboratory, Sakarya University, as illus-
trated in Figure 5. Vulnerabilities are examined by applying
the specified attack vectors on this testbed. The test envi-
ronment has a Windows XP installed PLC, several digital
I/O units, a network tap for performing MITM attacks, a
TwinCAT-installed virtual computer to download the con-
figuration/program, and a Snort IDS/IPS-installed virtual
computer for implementation of our proposal.
4.2. Attack Vector Generation on Device-Level Communica-
tion. Awidely accepted definition of vulnerability is a fault or
weakness that decreases or restricts the ability of a system to
withstand a threat or resume anewstable condition [49]. Sim-
ilarly, EtherCAT vulnerabilities are weaknesses from the na-
ture of the protocol, such as its frame structure, intra- and
inner-level communications, or the absence of encryption,
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Figure 4: Sample ENI.xml and ESI.xml (for EL1xxx module).
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authentication, and authorization mechanisms, as many
other industrial automation protocols do not include these.
Therefore, as stated in the literature review, many attacks,
such as code/program injection, PLC stop/run, displaying
RAM contents, replay attack, MITM attack, DoS attack, and
querying address or model information, are attempted to
weaken theCIA components of other protocols. Given that all
of these attacks take place through the communication pro-
tocol, it is likely that the potential vulnerabilities stem from
the EtherCAT protocol structure as well.
The vulnerability analysis stage of this researchwas exam-
ined only for field-level (device protocol) communication,
and the attack vectors were generated by programming each
attack individually. We have performed, succeeded in, and
later evaluated MAC spoofing, data injection, and slave-
address attack vectors, which are given in detail below.
TheMAC Spoofing Attack.This attack is based on manipulat-
ing the MAC address to an unauthorized master MAC and
consists of four steps:
(I) PLC program development and capturing communi-
cation packets
(II) Analyzing the captured packets
(III) Manipulating the MAC address
(IV) Execution of the attack
The first step is programming the PLC located in the
testbed environment. We have developed a simple PLC
program on the TwinCAT-installed computer, which turns
on an LED of an output for 5 seconds and then turns it off for
5 seconds (Figure 6(a)). While programming was completed,
the program outputs were mapped to the first output on the
EL2008 terminal of the EK1101 module on the I/O units in
Figure 5. After this operation, the program was loaded to the
PLC and run. Communication patterns between the PLC-
I/O units were captured by the MITM technique using the
network tap device presented in Figure 5.























output1 AT %QX0.0: BOOL;
t1: TON;
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memory1 AT %MX0.0: BOOL;
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Figure 6: (a) Developed simple PLC program and (b) MAC spoofing attack flow diagram.
Second, we analyzed the network traffic. We have ob-
served that multiple commands (NOP, logical write [LWR],
logical read [LRD], broadcast [Bxx], and autoincrement
physical read multiple write [ARMW]) were used syn-
chronously. In addition, the commands for setting the output
were sent synchronously in each cycle. They were not only
sent when the LED needs to be turned on. In other words,
the value “0” was sent in each cycle for turning off the output,
while “1” was sent to turn it on. Besides the EtherCAT field-
level communication, there were a few Link Layer Discovery
Protocol (LLDP) and Multicast Domain Name System
(MDNS) protocol packets. To generate the MAC spoofing
attack, the communication packets were first exported in
the K12 text file format by Wireshark, which is a packet-
sniffing program. Second, the MAC address of each packet
was replaced by a counterfeit MAC address of an authorized
member of the network (Figure 6(b)). It is observed that as
long as the PLC power is not interrupted, slaves accept the
incoming packets. We proved this statement by examining
the accepted working counter values of the packets and
monitoring the output lights. The outgoing working counter
value of the packets was 1, whereas the same incoming
working counter packet was incremented to 5. In addition,
the master PLC did not present any errors; thus, the system
administrator cannot realize that a MAC spoofing attack is
generated. The main reason for this is the absence of an
authentication mechanism between the master stations and
the slaves and the presence of only a basic level of identifica-
tion, which is performed during the configuration and device
scan phases.
Alternatively, due to the erased configurations of the I/O
units, the MAC spoofing attack cannot be performed if the
PLC power is interrupted. Thus, a network scan must be
done by TwinCAT in advance, and a network route must
be created between the PLC and I/O units. A related system
configuration must be completed, and the PLC must be in a
running state.
Data Injection Attack. This attack is developed by first
capturing the packets from the system through a MITM
approach. Since the LWR commands were responsible for
writing to the output, the data field of the LWR command is
manipulated (Figure 7(a)). The data length of the LWR con-
taining datagramwas 16 bytes.The payload of the datagram is
manipulated to 20 bytes. In addition, the datagram length and
frame length fields of the packet are modified. The datagram
length is set to 20, and the packet length is set to 150 bytes. As
there are no authentication or integrity controls, these frames
are accepted by the slave stations. Depending on the state of
the network, this type of attack could disrupt the real-time
capability or even lead to physical damage.
Attack on Slave Stations. When packet patterns of the com-
munication are observed, datagrams consisting only of the
LWR command are responsible for turning on the LED of
an output on the EL2008 module, which is a slave I/O unit.
Using this information, the detected datagrams are extracted
from the packets, and their address structure is examined
(Figure 7(b)). Analysis showed that individual I/O units of
the same terminals (EK1101) share the same logical addresses.
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Figure 7: (a) Data injection attack flow diagram and (b) slave access attack flow diagram.
0x000….1111
ECAT headerEthernet header Crafted datagram NOP commands...
10x00 29 0 0 0 1 0x0000LWR 0x01000000
Data WKIdx Length R C R M IRQCmd Log. addr.
RLenght Type
041 1
Figure 8: Sample crafted datagram with LWR command.
Therefore, a new crafted packet, which contains a datagram
with an LWR command and has the same length as the orig-
inal datagram (29 bytes), was generated by a program devel-
oped in C. The NOP commands were appended to achieve
the minimum frame length (60 bytes). The data field of the
LWR command was manipulated by changing the last 2 bytes
(little endian) to 255 (Figure 8). After that, packets were sent
back to the network.
The last 16 outputs of the same module flashed. Slaves do
not have any security profiling identification to distinguish
masters, and they cannot control the access of other memory
addresses. Therefore, we have found that slaves, commonly
known as dummy devices, allow access to their unauthorized
memory addresses and do not authenticate masters for each
flow. Thus, if the memory address map of a slave is correctly
detected, it will immediately respond to incoming packets.
5. Snort IDS/IPS on
Industrial Automation Systems
Snort, commonly accepted as an IDS/IPS system, is open-
source software used for detecting or preventing anomalies
within the network. It works in a signature-based manner. It
can be installed either on a virtual host or on a firewall as add-
on for deep packet inspection.The network to be investigated
should be passed through the Snort software. The chosen
signatures can be added to the rule database via Oinkcode
provided by the Snort developers. Traffic/flow/packets that
match these rules are processed by various actions, such as
log, block, or ignore.
Snort rules can be implemented either by using the rule
database in its repository or by writing the requested rules
manually. The Snort system identifies packets at the second
layer of TCP/IP protocol suite using the Libpcap library. The
systemfirst forwards an incoming packet to the decodermod-
ule for extracting third- and fourth-layer headers. Later, it
sends the packet to the default preprocessors, which are pre-
viously activated by the user in the snort.conf file (Figure 9).
Rule-based matching can be done during this stage as well.
Consecutively, if other related preprocessors that can handle
the packet up to the application layer are found, the packet
is forwarded to them; otherwise, the packet is handled by
the detection enginemodule at the fourth-layer protocol level
with processing rules and options. Eventually, it is saved to
the database in XML or other formats using alert, log, ignore,
or block actions.
Early versions of Snort were able to extract up to a third or
fourth layer, but newer versions can recognize the application
layer as well. The received packets are first extracted from
the Ethernet headers. During this step, preextraction of the
next protocol is also performed by examining the type field of
the header. The rest of the packet is forwarded to the related
module for the next protocol, such as TCP/UDP,ARP,VLAN,
and PPP processing. At last, the packet data is extracted with
the help of transport layer protocols. It should be noted that
the data can be handled or processed as default if and only
if it is carried by the supported level protocols. For instance,
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Figure 9: Packet flows in Snort.
if an analysis will be done for protocols over the application
layer or other protocols over the transport layer, additional
preprocessors are needed for extracting.
These preprocessors can identify alert, pass, drop, sdrop,
or reject rule actions. While some preprocessors come as
default with early versions of Snort, some are loaded dynami-
cally in runtimewith recent versions.These preprocessors are
called dynamic preprocessors. Snort commonly uses DNS,
ARPSpoof, FTP/Telnet, SSH, and other protocol preproces-
sors. In addition, it has a few automation system preproces-
sors, such as DNP3 or Modbus preprocessors.
Automation system protocols that come with recent
versions are very few and have a limited number of rules.
For instance, the Modbus preprocessor contains only three
rules, and these are defined for very simple packet analysis,
such as function code or protocol ID field checking.The com-
mon property of these automation system preprocessors is
that their underlying protocol communication is achieved
over the TCP/IP protocol suite. In other words, all of these
protocols process over the transport layer.
The main reason for this is related to a principle of Snort,
which is that Snort always extracts incoming packets until
the transport layer. After that, if any preprocessor will be
used, it forwards the packets to the preprocessor. Therefore,
all the preprocessors must receive the remaining part of
the packets after the transport layer extraction. However,
instead of having the transport layer over the data-link layer,
EtherCAT uses its own frame structure for device and EAP
protocols. This type of packet flow challenges the ECAT-
preprocessor development. The next section presents the
solution developed within the decoder engine of Snort.
5.1. Layer 2 EtherCAT Decoder for Snort. Each packet re-
ceived by Snort is handled within the decoder module. Once
extraction is done, it is forwarded to the corresponding
activated preprocessor using the transport layer protocols.
Packet flows inside this module are presented in Figure 10.
Previously developed industrial automation system protocol
preprocessors, such as DNP3 and Modbus/TCP, communi-
cate over TCP/IP and follow the path shown with red arrows.
As seen, incoming packets are delivered to preprocessors
once the layer 4 extraction is completed.Thus, during the pre-
processor development, the preprocessor must be registered
as either TCP or UDP protocols regarding the transportation
needs of the packets.
As mentioned, EtherCAT communication does not con-
tain the IP address or any transport layer protocols in
the factory and field levels. In this respect, it works dif-
ferently from the DNP3 or Modbus/TCP standards. Even
if preprocessors of industrial automation system protocols
that process only over Ethernet without using TCP/IP are
developed, they will not be supported by the Snort decoder
structure; thus, they will not function.Therefore, prior to the
preprocessor development, we first developed the EtherCAT
decoder (DecodeECAT) on the Snort decoder module. Then,
we delivered the remaining packet to the ECAT preprocessor
(Figure 10). An incoming EtherCAT packet follows the blue
path after the Ethernet decoder and reaches the EtherCAT
decoder.TheDecodeECAT computes some important param-
eters, such as the EtherCAT header structure, number of
datagrams within the packet, or the beginning of the payload,
which will be later used by the preprocessor, statistics, and
rules. It then locates the first bit of the data field and forwards
the packet to the ECAT preprocessor. To register this type of
preprocessor to the Snort system, the “none” value is defined
for the transport layer protocol field. This solution is an
improvement to Snort in the sense of supporting protocols
that transport over layer 2. Thus, the ECAT preprocessor in
Snort can process accurately.
5.2. ECAT-Preprocessor Development and
Trust-Node Communication Approach
5.2.1. ECAT Preprocessor. As stated, an ECAT preprocessor
that decodes EtherCAT protocol packets has not been intro-
duced by Snort yet. Therefore, any signature of EtherCAT
packets cannot be defined. In this context, the second
proposal on Snort, which now can identify and support the
coming layer 2 packets, is the development of a new prepro-
cessor that can process actions and define rules, particularly
for EtherCAT packets.
The previously activated ECAT preprocessor in snort.conf
first completes the registration and preloading stages (ini-
tialization in Figure 11). These processes are handled during
the startup configuration loading. During registration, the
process function,whichwill be called for each received packet,
must be specified. This function essentially checks the
rules defined with the preprocessor’s ID number for each
incoming packet, dynamically. Alternatively, for each ECAT-
preprocessor rule, one control function is created as well.




















Figure 10: Packet flows in the Snort decoder engine.
Once related functions operate, the attack or detected
anomaly packets are saved in different log formats using the
dpd structure. After checking the rules, the detection engine
is also calledwith the corresponding log and alert commands.
The detection engine is responsible for parsing the dynamic
preprocessor rule files. The preprocessor rules are written,
and the matching rules with the alarms are forwarded to the
output module (Figure 11).
5.2.2. Trust-Node Communication Approach. Snort prepro-
cessors provide IDS/IPS features by checking the defined
signatures. Each preprocessor has a unique generator ID
(gid), and each rule has a Snort ID (sid). The sid shows the
rule number for a particular preprocessor. The preprocessor
rules are defined differently from the common rule syntax, as
follows: rule type or action (message to be printed; snort ID;
generator ID; revision num; metadata; classtype;).
Supported industrial automation preprocessors of Snort
contain simple rules, such as checking the type field, packet
length, or protocol ID values of incoming frames. However,
the ECATpreprocessor provides deep packet inspection.This
process is based on the idea of detecting existing nodes in
the EtherCAT-applied system and accepting them as secure
nodes. The proposal is introduced as an outcome of the
vulnerability analysis performed in the previous section.
As identified in the EtherCATvulnerability analysis, there
is no authenticationmechanismbetween themaster and slave
terminals. Taking advantage of this weakness, various attacks
can be applied. One of these attacks is collecting a sufficient
number of packets over the system anddetecting a slave. After
this, to investigate other nodes or slaves, the attacker alters the
address of the slave and sends similar packets to different or
consecutive addresses. This way, network map, address, and
configuration information about the nodes of the network
can be predicted.
To prevent these types of vulnerabilities, we detected all
devices within the EtherCAT system and loaded them during
the startup configuration of the preprocessor of Snort. These
nodes are called trust nodes, and any communication with a
different slave address, master address, command type, data
size, or command order is detected.This approach is achieved
by creating an advanced rule that saves the log or alert with
146 ECAT-preprocessor ID numbers.
Each received packet that has an EtherCAT type value
is delivered to the preprocessor after decoding the Ethernet
and EtherCAT headers. Here, the preprocessor checks every
packet to determine whether the address of each datagram,
command, command order, data size, and MAC address
of master devices matches the trust communication iden-
tified value. For signature-based detection, three rules are
generated, namely, untrusted slave, untrusted master, and
data injection. According to the following defined rule, for
the addresses not included in the trust communication, an
alarm is generated and saved into the log file (Figure 11):
alert (msg: “ECAT UNTRUSTED SLAVE”; sid: 1; gid: 146; rev:
1; metadata: rule-type preproc; classtype: protocol-command-
decode;).
The trust-node identification approach is a solution intro-
duced for preventing vulnerabilities and detecting attacks
on EtherCAT field-level communication. This method is
executed on the initialization and rule-matching stages of the
preprocessor. The method is as follows. After the network

















































Figure 11: The ECAT preprocessor.
scan and initial configuration stage are completed on Twin-
CAT, each ESI file of the slave is loaded to the EtherCAT
configurator tool, which connects to the master terminals.
This ESI file contains essential information about a specific
slave during EtherCAT communication. Slave ESI files and/or
online slave information is combined on the master side, and
an XML-based ENI file is created. This file contains some
startup configuration data, such as the master information,
slave information, cycle, and process image data (Figure 12).
The ECAT preprocessor decodes the ENI file, which is
generated during the critical system runtime using the parser
presented in Figure 11. Decoding is completed during Snort
runtime at the initialization stage. This way, we identify the
master and slave nodes, data size, commands, and even the
command orders included during the usual EtherCAT com-
munication approved by the engineering station so that only
the flows that fit with these attributes are accepted as trusted
communication. Eventually, each packet that is sourced from
the decoder engine during runtime and is destined to the
ECAT preprocessor dynamically is checked, whether it is
trusted or not; thus, a basic level of security mechanism is
provided over the network.
5.3. Preprocessor Testing. To test the ECAT preprocessor, we
used the testbed environment presented in Figure 5. The
virtual machine with Snort installed is located between
the master and slaves, as shown in Figure 12. The ECAT-
preprocessor registration and initialization can be seen in
Figures 13(a), 13(b), and 13(c). The ECAT preprocessor reads
the ENI.xml file exported from the TwinCAT-installed engi-
neering station and extracts available trusted nodes. Later,
it loads all activated preprocessors with version and build
numbers into Snort and waits for incoming packets. When
an EtherCAT packet is received, the preprocessor extracts
all datagrams and headers, such as EtherCAT and datagram
headers. A decoded random EtherCAT packet is printed in
Figure 13(d) for testing purposes.
For the attack on slave stations, crafted EtherCAT data-
grams with the LWR command are generated with an
untrusted node (address: 257) and sent to the network. The
packet in Figure 13(d) includes one for those datagrams since
the untrusted slave access alarms are triggered.
For a MAC address spoofing attack, the frame MAC
addresses are replaced by unapproved master hardware
addresses and sent to the network.The flagged alarm is given
in Figure 13(e). It is observed that the ECAT preprocessor can
detect defined attacks and log them properly as alarms into
the alert file presented in Figure 13(f).
For data injection attacks, some other fields extracted
from the ENI file, such as command names, the command
order, and the expected data length of each command, are
used.These fields are under the cyclic section of the ENI file. If


































































Figure 12: The process of ESI-ENI files.
any of the attributes, such as command order, does notmatch,
an alarm is generated. For instance, when the ENI file in the
testbed is analyzed, the ARMW command is expected as the
fourth frame in the package with 4-byte data. For testing
purposes, order and data length of the ARMW contained
datagram are modified. It is observed that any change in the
order of the command, data length, or data field is detected,
and an alarm is generated in the alarm file (Figure 13(f)).
The attack vectors mentioned in Section 4.2 can be simply
prevented by the features of the ECAT preprocessor.
The trust-node approach is able to detect MAC spoofing,
data injection, and slave-address access attack vectors, when
they attempt to reach disapproved components by the created
rule. Moreover, MAC spoofing attacks can be prevented by
checking the master hardware addresses in the ENI files,
while data injection can be determined by data field checking
for each expected command. Slave-address access attacks can
be prevented by checking the logical, autoincremented, or
physical addresses of slaves. Moreover, since the ECAT pre-
processor is a base IDS/IPS proposal for EtherCAT systems
and allows creating new rules, replay or other types of attacks
can also be eliminated by defining additional rules, such as
time-based rules.
To visualize the preprocessor logs and trust-node ap-
proach alerts, a new virtual machine is set up and Elastic-
search, Logstash, and Kibana (ELK) stack is developed. The
monitoring system receives Snort logs from the EtherCAT
preprocessor through Filebeat tool, and based on the syslogs
and JSON-based database queries, it visualizes the intrusions
to the users. It is observed that, under a real working con-
dition, the prepared EtherCAT dashboard presents the same
intrusions using the system logs (Figure 14).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, an EtherCAT device-level vulnerability analysis
is performed. Based on the vulnerabilities, the new ECAT
preprocessor is developed using Snort by introducing a
trust-node communication approach. To the best of our
knowledge, no vulnerability analysis research has specifically
focused on EtherCAT communication principles. There-
fore, prior to the preprocessor development, communication
analysis was performed on factory, device, and IP-based
communication levels. Later, the device-level vulnerability
analysis was achieved by creating attack vectors related to
the device-level protocol specifications. Attack vectors were
implemented as MAC spoofing, data injection, and slave-
address access attacks.
The results confirmed that EtherCAT does not provide a
level of security between slave and master communication.
Attackers can easily sniff EtherCAT traffic and send their
crafted packets over the Ethernet cable. This also proves the
ability to apply well-known TCP/IP attacks on EtherCAT
systems, as it is carried over the Ethernet. We observed that
slave andmaster devices create the routewhile the connection
is initiating, and this connection expires immediately after
the power of the PLC is down. Except for this initiation, no
security exists for each flow between master and slave.
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Figure 13: ECAT preprocessor, results, and log.
Figure 14: ELK dashboard.
This vulnerability leads to a MAC spoofing attack. More-
over, there is nomechanism to recognize themaster for a slave
or to prevent a brute-force network slave scan. If the slave-
address map or address hierarchy of the EtherCAT network
can be predicted, other memory addresses of the slave or
other slave addresses can be accessed. In addition, there is
no security check for data-size variations, which could even
cause physical damage.
Regarding the analysis results, it is determined that the
EtherCAT protocol requires a security mechanism to prevent
attacks coming from the Ethernet infrastructure.
Since there is no preprocessor on Snort for detecting
EtherCAT packets, our proposed ECAT preprocessor pro-
vides basic protection over the EtherCAT-applied critical sys-
tems. It works in passive sniffingmode so thatwe donot inter-
rupt the real-time communication or send packets into the
network. The ECAT preprocessor is loaded during Snort ini-
tialization and catches every EtherCAT packet Snort receives.
Since Snort supports other industrial automation system
protocols, such as Modbus or DNP3, it will also provide the
requested real-time feature of the EtherCAT.
We have extended the Snort features to handle EtherCAT
protocol packets by our DecodeECAT contribution into the
Snort decoder engine. This way, contributions, such as rule
addition or new prevention methods, can be easily adopted
by defining related functions of the proposal into the ECAT
preprocessor. One rule is created in the preprocessor rule file,
which uses the trust-node communication technique.
This approach exports master hardware addresses, slave,
logical, incremented, or physical addresses, and commands,
order of commands, and data sizes in ENI files. By checking
these data, it detectsMAC spoofing, data injection, and slave-
address access attacks to and from the addresses that are not
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defined in the ENI.xml network configuration files. In fact,
the XML configuration files also exist in other ICS protocols,
such as PROFINET or Sercos. Thus, the introduced method
can be applied for other protocols and preprocessors in ICS or
be globalized by giving an overall solution for critical systems.
Another point is that some of the real-time Ethernet pro-
tocols execute over in layer 2.However, Snort can handle layer
3, layer 4, or application layer protocols. Our improvement
presents how preprocessors of protocols executing at layer 2
can be developed.
The ICS systems are dedicated systems. Thus, configura-
tions are made by the engineering station in advance. In this
configuration, existing hardware has individual ID informa-
tion and master devices that control the system and compute
all processes regarding these ID data. The ID data are saved
as GSD, ESI, ENI, and other formats depending on the pro-
tocol. The given trust-node approach is applicable to other
protocols/systems by examining the file formats and princi-
ples of operations of the systems.
In our research, since packet processing or overloading
the system in runtime causes serious problems in ICS, the
passivemonitoring technique is investigated and applied on a
real-time protocol using Snort. Performing penetration tests
on running ICS is not recommended, and this obstructs the
detection of vulnerabilities. Using the passive monitoring
approach, threats and risks caused by the vulnerabilities can
be reduced by defining rules.
7. Future Work
There are several directions for further research. First, we see
this work as a foundation and encourage the vulnerability
analysis and prevention proposals of the EtherCAT protocol
to increase industrial automation system security. For
instance, EtherCAT obviously needs a lightweight encryp-
tion-based security mechanism for secure communication
like other industrial protocols. This could be a further study
over the EtherCAT network. Second, we need to improve the
preprocessor to prevent factory and IP-based communication
attacks. Therefore, the EtherCAT protocol requires more
vulnerability analyses at all communication levels. However,
we believe that our analysis shows the fundamental vulnera-
bilities, and the proposal is a novel approach that provides an
efficient means for critical systems.
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